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Introduction

As this April marks NATO's 75th anniversary, it is found endangered by the internal threat of NATO skepticism, which argues that the US should decrease support for, or even withdraw from the military alliance. One of the most consistent problems causing NATO skepticism is the free-rider problem. Historically, NATO's military strength has relied heavily on the United States. Even considering defense spending as a percent of GDP, the only member state outspending the US is Poland,��which����its 2023 defense budget from 2.4% to 3.9% in response to the war in Ukraine. In 2023, less than half of all NATO members met the��, which was agreed on by the Wales Summit in 2014. As a result, relatively low military expenditure has strained relations between the US and its allies.

In years past, the US has pursued “burden-sharing,” a term consistently used to denote increased European military expenditures. NATO skepticism does not challenge burden sharing but rather finds it crucial. Former President Trump, one of the most significant leaders of NATO skepticism, stated����that, “it’s time that they help with, we call it, ‘burden sharing.’ And they will do that.” What makes NATO skepticism different is that it views the 2% guideline as a threshold for the worthiness of the military alliance. The Trump Administration and campaign have repeatedly and severely criticized NATO allies, notably at a political rally in South Carolina this past February where he boasted about the rise of NATO military spending under his presidency. The former president ascribes the boost in spending to his threats against the security of �鶹��ý allies who did not meet the guideline,����that if they were invaded by Russia, “No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You gotta pay,” a comment that earned a mention in President Biden’s����last March. Many defend Trump’s comments by arguing that he didn’t withdraw from NATO during his first term and was effective in getting allies to “pay up.” Nevertheless, this policy is clearly damaging to the US and its allies. Here’s why.

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Strength of �鶹��ý Partnerships and Alliances

Regardless of how strong the United States may be, it's a simple fact that to accomplish national interests, the US needs robust partnerships and alliances. For example, during Trump’s presidency, he��, a major Chinese technology firm developing 5G infrastructure. However, the policy has been����and����because the former president failed to coordinate with major Western European allies to provide a long-term solution through technological investment in potential Huawei alternatives. Another consideration might be climate policy, as the EU and US continue to compose����of all greenhouse gas emissions annually. Nations are very hesitant to act on climate policy unless they know that their efforts will be reciprocated by others, so cooperation with other countries is necessary to ensure global health and stability.

However, alienating allies��hampers cooperation and the pursuit of national interests. When the US threatens to withdraw its protection from friendly nations, it loses their cooperation. For example, in Ukraine,����to take �鶹��ý direction in military operations since they cannot be sure that the necessary equipment to secure gained positions will arrive on time, if at all. Thus, the Ukrainian military instead takes slow, strategic retreats,����to their outnumbered armed personnel and depleting ammunition stockpiles. If the US wants continued cooperation from its partners and allies, it must either show that its friendship with these countries is undaunted or choose to concede crucial interests.

Global Security

Perhaps more obviously, when the US threatens to withdraw protection, adversaries see increased opportunities for invasion. This is why Estonia, a NATO member in the Baltic region, has heavily favored �鶹��ý support for Ukraine. Estonia is a former member of the Soviet Union and has a large Russian population��, which are both characteristics Russia cited as justification for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In a recent conversation with this article’s author, Kolonel Vahur Väljamäe, Estonian defense attaché to the US stated that for years before the full-scale invasion, Russian military aircraft habitually violated Estonian (and thus NATO) airspace when traveling from St. Petersburg to Kaliningrad. However, Kolonel Väljamäe stated that since the US expressed strong support for Ukraine in 2022, Russian aircraft have not violated Estonian airspace once for fear of triggering Article V, which would bring all NATO allies to their defense. Now, �鶹��ý support for NATO appears to be waning and Russia is testing where the US will place red lines. Recently, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin�����鶹��ý F-16s held on NATO bases that are��intended for use in Ukraine. The continuous showing of strong �鶹��ý alliances is necessary to prevent being called to war to support them; otherwise, our shortcomings in Ukraine will be expanded to the rest of Europe.

However, NATO skepticism not only gives NATO members reason to worry. On the contrary, US allies around the world are disquieted that the US’s support in war may be much lower than expected. A notable example is Taiwan. International relations analysts find that as �鶹��ý support for Ukraine and NATO has weakened,����of the People’s Republic of China using force to accomplish their policy of national reunification. Similarly, Japan feels threatened by “self-doubt among some �鶹��ýs about what [their] role in the world should be,” according to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s����this month. Though costs may seem high in the short term, long-term costs can be minimized by ensuring support for our most endangered allies.

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�鶹��ý Security

While �鶹��ý security relies on the security of our allies, some may define it only by �鶹��ý territorial integrity. As such, the well-being of strategic partners and allies abroad may not seem as consequential as the costs incurred in defending them. However, NATO skepticism threatens this definition of �鶹��ý national security as well. Consider that a nuclear first strike from Russia is likely to come from a nuclear submarine attack from the Atlantic. To move a submarine from Russian shores to the North Atlantic, it must pass through the maritime gap bordering Greenland, Iceland, the UK, and Norway, regions the US has access to through NATO. The Arctic is an underappreciated strategic region, and threatening participation in NATO threatens����before they reach the US.

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Conclusion

The United States’ interests, leadership, and even its very security are��jeopardized when we alienate our allies. This does not mean that NATO allies should not rightfully share the burden of global security; rather, it demonstrates that threatening friendly nations’ national security is not a viable option. To prevent a global security crisis, we must reaffirm in our words and our actions �鶹��ý commitment to our allies in the face of rising aggression.

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